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SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE
OF

LESTER RALPH ROMERO and
1\'l:\XINE ROMERO, his wife,
Pla·i nti.ffs and Appellants.

vs.
VICTOR SCHMIDT and RAE SCHMIDT,
his wife; TOM B. WILCOX and
MRS. TOl\II WILCOX, his wife; and
MR. ART CASEY and MARIE CASEY,
his wife,

No. 9922

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action to foreclose real estate contract as note and
mortgage. Respondents allege tender and estoppel as a
defense.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
All elements necessary to prove Plaintiffs' and Appellants' case were admitted and the defenses alleged were
tried b~· the court sitting as a court of equity with an
advisory jury. Judgment of no cause of action was entered
against Plaintiffs and Appellants on the theories of tender
and equitable estoppel.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs and Appellants seek an order vacating the
judgment of no cause of action and directing the District
Court to enter judgment for foreclosure of the mortgage
and a reasonable attorneys' fee for services in connection
with the trial and this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants sold a residence to respondents Schmidt,
July 17, 1961 (R. 100-101), on a uniform real estate contract (Ex. 1-P) with a $45.00 down payment (R. 100).
Romeros demanded and received payments promptly for
13 months, to and including the August 1, 1962 payment,
at which time Schmidts sold the residence to Respondent
Wilcox (R. 173-174), who assumed and agreed to pay
the balance due on the Schmidt-Romero contract (Ex.
1-P; R. 179, L. 19-22). Appellants were not contacted
concerning the sale to Wilcox or the balance due on the
contract in connection with that sale.
Respondents Wilcox entered into an agreement with
Respondents Casey for the sale of the residence to
Caseys (Ex. 3-P). Wilcox and his partner, Glavas (R.
109), contacted Appellant Romero andjor Romeros' associate, Taylor, several times concerning the unpaid
balance due on the residence (R. 110-118; R. 147-151; R.
156-159), and Romero was also contacted by Wallace, the
real estate agent handling the sale between Wilcox and
Caseys (R. 131-133); however, the parties did not reach
an agreement as to the unpaid balance due on the contract.
About September 19-20, 1962, during a meeting with
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Wilcox and Glavis (R. 156; R. 110), Romero stated that
the September 1, 1962 payment was delinquent, at which
time Wilcox made an unqualified promise to pay before
the end of the 30-day grace period (R. 164, L. 20-30, R.
165, L. 1-2). Wilcox actually paid the September 1, 1962
puyment within the grace period by delivering a check
(Ex. 2-P) to Romero's office about September 29, 1962,
which check was returned marked "Insufficient Funds"
about October 18, 1962 (R. 101, L. 24-30). About October
15, 1962, prior to the time when the September check was
returned, Romero stated to Wilcox's realtor that the
October 1, 1962 payment had not been made (R. 161, L.
~1-25). On October 24, 1962, Romeros caused a notice
tR. 9-10) to be served upon the Respondents (R. 102, L.
3-17) wherein Romeros elected, under the provisions of
paragraph 16C of the real estate contract (Ex. 1-P), to
treat said contract as a note and mortgage, to declare the
entire unpaid balance on said contract to be immediately
due and payable (R. 9-10). Payment was not made, thus
on January 8, 1963, Romeros commenced this action for
foreclosure.

Respondents admit that the September 1, 1962 payment
was not made within the grace period, that Romeros
elected to treat the contract as a note and mortgage and
served notice upon them declaring the contract balance
all immediately due and that payment of the balance
due on the contract was not made. Based upon the
stipulations of fact, Appellants established a prima-facie
case. The only issues are the defenses of tender and of
equitable estoppel asserted by the Respondents.
There is little dispute about the facts, except as to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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content of the conversation between Romero and Wallace
and even Wallace's version of the conversation does not'
aid Respondents in either of their defenses, as indicated
more fully in the discussion under the specific points.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS DID NOT MAKE A LEGAL TENDER OF DELINQUENT PAYMENT PRIOR TO ACCELERATION OF BALANCE DUE AND APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A FORECLOSURE
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The word "Tender" is defined as an unconditional offer
of payment, coupled with a present ability to do so, and
consists of the actual production and offer to pay, in
current coin of the realm, at the time and place specified
in the contract, of a sum not less than the amount due
on a specific debt or obligation (Somerton State Bank v.
Maxey, 22 Ariz. 365, 197 P. 892, 14 ALR 1117; Walker v.
Houston, 215 Cal. 742, 12 P.2d 952, 87 ALR 937; Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe, 170 Or. 79, 86 P.2d 960; 52
Am. Jur. Tender Sec. 2).
Respondents alleged and the court found (R. 83, Par. 3)
that plaintiffs' right to declare the entire balance due was
cut off by reason of an alleged tender, to Appellants, of
delinquent payments prior to the service, by Appellants,
of the notice declaring the entire contract balance immediately due and payable (R. 9-10). The advisory jury
in this equitable action (R. 184) was given instructions
as to the meaning of "Tender" (R. 78) and answered
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special interrogatories to the effect that a tender of all
delinquent payments was made to Romeros (R. 80, Par. 3
and 4); however, said interrogatories failed to inquire
whether the alleged "tender" occurred after or before the
notice which declared the contract balance due. Tenders
of delinquent installments (R. 33, Par. 5) were made
by the Respondents after said notice (R. 9-10) was served,
however, those tenders were made too late. The only
effect of a tender after maturity is to prevent the acquisition of any further rights on the part of the creditor and
not to deprive him of rights acquired prior to that time.
(McClellan v. Davis, 45 Idaho 541, 263 P. 1002; Anno:
15 LRA(NS) 1165.) It is likely that the jury answered
this interrogatory on the basis of tenders made after
October 24, 1963, and since tenders after that date are
wholly immaterial to the issues in the case, the answer of
the jury to interrogatories concerning tender (R. 80) are
unreliable and should be disregarded. The definition given
to the jury by the court as to the meaning of "tender" (R.
78) is improper, since it would permit the jury to find that
a "tender" was made by" ... an offer to pay, ... " whereas
a legal "tender" requires far more than an "offer to pay."
It is uncontroverted that the September 1, 1962 payment was made September 29, 1962 by a personal check
(Ex. 2-P), which was dishonored by the bank and returned about October 18, 1962, marked "Insufficient
Funds'' (R. 101, L. 24-30), and that the notice declaring
the balance due was served October 24, 1962 (R. 102, L.
3-17). The only indication of any "offer to pay" prior to
the service of the notice on October 24, 1962, is the statement allegedly made to Romero by Wallace, the Realtorwhich statement Romero testified was not made (R. 161,
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L. 17-20) -to the effect that Caseys' funds were available
in Wallace's trust account from which any delinquency
that existed could be paid at any time that Romero verified the unpaid contract balance to be assumed by Caseys
and the Wilcox-Casey sale was closed (R. 133-135).
Wallace, as a realtor hoping to earn a commission, was
an interested party to the Casey-Wilcox transaction, and
his testimony should be weighed with that in mind. It is
impossible for him to have made a tender concerning the
September, 1962 payment, which is the default upon
which this action is made, since the conversation with
Romero during which the alleged "tender" occurred was
October 15, 1962 (R. 131, R. 159-160) -the check for the
September payment (Ex. 2-P) was not returned until
three days later on October 18, 1962 (R. 106, L. 21-30, R.
107, L. 1-9). The statement by Wallace that " ... I believe
he did tell me at that time that there was a check given
him for that $89.00 that was returned, ... " (R. 141, L. 1517) is obviously in error and is contrary to his prior
testimony in which he stated that Romero did not indicate to him in what manner Respondents were in default
and that Wallace knew nothing about the check that was
issued and later dishonored (R. 141, L. 2-8). Romero
testified (R. 163, L. 10-14) that he could not have told
Wallace that he was going to foreclose as alleged by
Wallace (R. 133, L. 5-9) since he, at that time, had no
knowledge concerning the dishonor of the check for the
September payment (Ex. 2-P). Romero's testimony is
uncontroverted that he had no conversations with Wallace, Wilcox or Glavas after the check (Ex. 2-P) was
returned and that he immediately took it to the office of
his attorney (R. 161, L. 26-30, R. 162, L. 1-3). Romero
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testified (R. 162, L. 4-7) that no one ever tendered to him
the amount of money necessary to cover the dishonored
check (Ex. 2-P) before service of the notice declaring the
balance of the contract due (R. 9-10). Wallace testified
that he never offered or handed any money to Romeros
(R. 139, L. 30; R. 140, L. 1-6); that he could not offer or
hand the money to Romeros (R. 140, L. 4); that there
were no funds in his trust account for Romeros (R. 140, L.
17-19); that all funds in his trust account were held for
payment to Wilcox (R. 140, L. 14-15); that the funds held
by him were paid to him by Caseys with authority torelease the money only after a correct contract balance was
determined, which they could assume, and after the transaction between Wilcox and Caseys was closed (R. 135,
L. 17-22; R. 136, L. 19-25). The money which was allegedly "tendered" was still the property of Caseys and who
had not authorized a tender of that money to Romeros,
as shown by the above quoted testimony of Wallace, and
accordingly that money was not available for Wallace to
tender to Romeros on behalf of Wilcox, as urged by Mr.
Hoggan (R. 135, L. 5-12). A tender cannot be made of
funds which are not the debtor's to tender and in which
he has then no property (Vernon Center State Bank v.
Mangelsen, 166 Minn. 472, 208 NW 186, 48 ALR 710). The
present ability to make a strict tender is essential to a
\'alid tender (Somerton State Bank v. Maxey, supra). It
is not sufficient that a person is present from whom the
money might be borrowed, unless he actually consents to
loan it for the purpose of the tender (Vernon Center State
Bank v. Mangelson, supra), which tender was expressly
forbidden under the authority given to Wallace by Caseys
(R. 135, L. 17-22; R. 136, L. 19-25). A person making a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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written tender of money in accordance with 78-27-1, UCA,
1953, quoted below, which excuses the actual production
of the money if the tender is in writing, must act in good
faith and have the ability to produce the money for the
tender to be valid (Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 U. 3, 10; 36 P.
202) , and under the facts in our case, even if the alleged
tender by Wallace had been in writing it would have been
insufficient because he had no authority to tender the
money in his possession at that time as indicated above.
A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid tender
(Talty v. Freedman's Sav. & T. Co. 93 US 321, 23 L ed
886; Somerton State Bank v. Maxey, supra) and accordingly even without the conditions attached by Wallace in
his alleged tender, his acts and statements (discussed
above) would be insufficient to constitute a valid tender.
A tender requires the physical act of offering the money
or thing to be tendered, and this cannot rest on implication alone. The law requires an actual, present, physical
offer; it is not satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay,
which, although indicative of present possession of money
and intention to produce it, is unaccompanied by any
visible manifestation of intention to make the offer good
(Peugh v. Davis, 113 US 542, 28 Led 1127, 5 Sup. Ct. 622;
Somerton State Bank v. Maxey, supra; Wooten v. Dahlquist, 42 Idaho 121, 244 P. 407; 52 Am. Jur. Tender
Sec. 7). Mr. Hoggan's position throughout the case
has been that a legal tender was made when Wallace
stated that payment of delinquencies would be made if
Romero first determined and agreed with the defendants
as to the correct contract balance (R. 135, L. 8-12; R. 33,
Par. 3; R. 41, Par. 3; R. 188, L. 29-30; R. 189, L. 1-6). Even
if defendants complied with all other requirements of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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valid tender (which we deny), the alleged tender was
expressly conditional upon Romeros first performing certain acts and making certain agreements, which Romeros
had no legal obligation to do under the terms of their
contract with Schmidts (Ex. 1-P). Romeros were not
parties to the Wilcox-Casey transaction, and had no duties
or obligations with respect to that transaction. Romeros'
only obligation was to convey title to the property when
the full purchase price had been paid. Romeros demanded
payment of the full purchase price (R. 9-10), but it was
not paid, therefore the duty to convey did not arise.
The delivery of the dishonored check (Ex. 2-P) did not
constitute a tender (Sieverts v. White, 2 U.2d 351, 273
P.2d 974, 975). 78-27-1, UCA, 1953, reads as follows:
"An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money
or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal
property, is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual
production and tender of the money, instrument or
property." (Emphasis added.)

This statute creates an exception in the case of written
tenders, to the common law rule which requires the
actual production and offer of the money. No written
tender was made in our case, and, accordingly, under this
statute, the Respondents were required to actually produce and tender the money to constitute a legal tender,
which they clearly failed to do. The law requires that the
tenderer have the money present and ready, and that he
produce and actually offer it to the other party. (Somerton State Bank v. Maxey, supra; Anno: 33 LRA 234.) The
money must be actually shown to the person to whom it
is tendered (Peugh v. Davis, supra), and some courts
have attached much importance to this, on the theory that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the sight of the money might be highly persuasive in
tempting the creditor to accept (Finch v. Brook, 1 Bing
NC 253, 131 Eng. Reprint 1114, 6 Eng. Rul Cas 591).
The conditions discussed above, which were attached to
the alleged tender, were not conditions upon which the
Respondents had a right to insist under the contractural
relationship between Appellants and Respondents, and
accordingly, even if the alleged tender were otherwise
sufficient, the conditions attached thereto would render it
ineffective. (Sieverts v. White, supra; Bohler v. Callaway,
267 US 479, 69 L ed 745, 45 S Ct 431; Queensboro Nat.
Bank v. Kelly (CCA 2d) 48 F2d 574, 87 ALR 1172, writ of
certiorari denied in 284 US 620, 76 L ed 529, 52 S Ct 9;
Bellamah v. Schmider, 68 NM 247, 360 P.2d 656; 52 Am.
Jur. Tender Sec. 24.)
Mr. Hoggan has at all times acknowledged that the
alleged "tender" by Wallace was conditional (R. 33, Par.
3; R. 41, Par. 3; R. 135, L. 8-12; R. 188, L. 29-30; R. 180,
L. 1-6) and could not be otherwise, for the alleged reason
that information concerning the unpaid balance was required before an unconditional tender could be made,
which information was allegedly in the exclusive possession of the Appellants (R. 189); however, this assertion is
contrary to the facts since only 13 payments had been
made on the contract (R. 122, L. 11-15); there was no disagreement as to the original balance (R. 121, L. 8-16), the
interest rate (R. 121, L. 16-19), the dates and amounts of
the payments made on the contract (R. 120-121), the
insurance costs to be added and the small difference concerning taxes was readily resolved by the parties (R. 121122). Glavis and Wallace had computed such balances on
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contracts many times and could make such a computation
easily (R. 122, L. 11-15; R. 137, L. 25-28), and accordingly
the determination of an accurate balance was a simple
mathematical computation which the Respondents could
have easily made. No information concerning the contract
was within the exclusive knowledge of Appellants, and
Appellants had no duty, under the terms of his contract
(Ex. 1-P), to make the mathematical computation and to
enter into an agreement that the balance thus determined
was correct. Respondents' obligation to pay $89.00 per
month to Appellants within the time specified in the contract (Ex. 1-P) is clear and unambiguous and has no
relataionship to a possible sale between Wilcox and
Caseys, or the desire of the Respondents to determine an
accurate unpaid balance due on the contract as of a
specific time. The parties expressly contracted and agreed
that time was of the essence in the contract (Ex. 1-P, Par.
17), and such a stipulation is binding upon the courts of
equity (Cheney v. Libby, 134 US 68, 33 Led 818, 10 S. Ct.
498; Anno: 79 ALR 1231). The court should enforce the
clear intention of the parties as expressed by the written
contract. (Forrester v. Cook, 77 U 137, 292 P. 206; Burt v.
Stringfellow, 45 U. 207, 143 P. 234; Udy v. Jensen, 63 U.
94, 222 P. 597; Peck v. Judd, 7 U. 2d 420.)
Clearly the Court erred in holding that Respondents
had tendered the delinquent September, 1962 installment
to Appellants prior to the service of the notice declaring
the entire unpaid balance to be immediately due and
payable, and accordingly the judgment of the District
Court should be reversed and a decree of foreclosure
entered in favor of Appellants and against Respondents.
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POINT II
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED BY THEIR
ACTS OR OMMISSIONS TO EXERCISE THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE OF THE CONTRACT AND FINDINGS OF COURT WITH RESPECT TO ESTOPPEL
ARE NOT WITHIN THE ISSUES OF THE CASE.
Respondents allege equitable estoppel as a defense and
asked the Court of Equity to relieve them from the effect
of the operative acceleration clause contained in the
contract (Ex. 1-P, Par. 16C), which acceleration clause
was exercised by Appellants (R. 9-10; R. 102) after the
check issued September 29, 1962, by Respondent Wilcox
(Ex. 2-P) in payment of the September 1, 1962, installment due on said contract, was dishonored by the bank
and returned marked "Insufficient Funds" on October 18,
1962, which was 18 days after the expiration of the 30-day
grace period allowed by the contract (Ex. 1-P, Par. 16;
R. 101, L. 24-30). Respondents' theory as shown by the
Findings of Fact (R. 82-84) seems to be that Mr. Romero's
misrepresentations, actions and conduct in failing to
determine and agree upon a correct contract balance,
allegedly MISLED Respondents to their detriment, PREVENTED Respondents from making their September 1,
1962 contract payment to Appellants and thus CAUSED
the September 1, 1962, payment not to be paid within the
grace period and thus CAUSED that delinquency, which
is the delinquency relied upon by Appellants in exercising
the acceleration clause that declared the entire contract
balance to be immediately due and payable (R. 33, Par. 3;
R. 41, Par. 3; R. 51, Par. 2; R. 83, Par. 4 through 11;
R. 189).
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RESPONDENTS' POSITION IS WHOLLY WITHOUT
MERIT OR CANDOR. The sole and proximate cause of
non-payment of the September 1, 1962 contract payment
was "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" in the bank account (Ex.
2-P). No acts or omissions of Appellants CAUSED that
check to be dishonored.
The Court awarded judgment of no cause of action (R.
86) against Appellants on their foreclosure action on the
theories of tender (discussed under Point I above) and on
the theory of equitable estoppel, however, the Findings of
Fact (R. 82-84) entered as a part of and in support of that
judgment go far beyond the findings of the advisory jury
(R. 80) used in this equitable action (R. 184) or the
decision announced by the Judge in open Court, and the
findings and issues contained therein are, for the most
part, wholly unsupported by the issues raised in the
pleadings (R. 32-34; R. 40-42), the issues specified for
trial in this matter by the pre-trial order (R. 50-52) or
which were actually tried or litigated before the Court
during the trial of this case.
The only issue raised by the Respondents concerning
equitable estoppel in their answers (R. 33, Par. 3; R. 41,
Par. 3) and in the pre-trial order (R. 51, Par. 2) is the
allegation that Appellants failed and refused to verify the
contract balance to facilitate closing of the sale of the
residence by Wilcox to Caseys. Respondents waived their
right to raise additional defenses by not asserting those
defenses in their answer as required by Rule 12 (b),
URCP. Rule 12(h), URCP, pertaining to waiver of defenses, reads in part as follows:
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"WAIVER OF DEFENSES. A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he
has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except ... "
The pre-trial order (R. 51, Par. 2) made in this case
limited the estoppel issue to the question of whether:
"2. Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming failure to
pay within the time allowed by reason of their own
failure to verify the contract balance on the SchmidtRomero contract to facilitate the Wilcox-Casey closing.'' (Emphasis added.)
The pre-trial order required that "Any objections to this
pre-trial order must be filed within one week from date
hereof." No objections were filed by Respondents, and, in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 16, URCP, that
order controlled the subsequent course of the action and
limited the issues to be tried to those specified by the
pre-trial order. The Court erred in including findings
involving new issues concerning estoppel in its Findings
of Fact (R. 82-84), which were outside the scope of the
issues to be tried in this case as specified by the pleadings
and pre-trial order and which findings are, for the most
part, wholly unsupported by any evidence received in
this case.
Since the matters tried to the Court were equitable and
the jury was only advisory (R. 80), the appeal in this
case is as to both the law and fact (Rule 72(a), URCP),
and the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may be raised on appeal (Rule 52 (b),
URCP).
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The decision of the District Court also should be reversed because the findings prepared by Respondents and
signed by the court do not respond to and are not in
conformity with the issues (Giauque v. Salt Lake City,
42 U. 89, 129 P. 429) , go far beyond the findings of the
advisory jury (R. 80) in this equitable action (R. 184) or
the decision announced by Judge Faux in open Court, the
findings are made without the issues, and there is no
evidence to support them. (In re Evans, 42 U. 282, 314,
130 P. 217; Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co., 42 U.
520, 132 P. 338; Greenhalgh v. United Tintic Mines Co.,
42 U. 524, 132 P. 390; Brittain v. Gorman, 42 U. 586, 133
P. 370; Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71 U. 577, 268 P. 562; Thomas
v. Farrell, 82 U. 535, 26 P.2d 328; Parowan Mercantile Co.
v. Gurr, 83 U. 436, 30 P.2d 207; Pieper v. Hatch, 86 U. 292,
43 P.2d 700.)
Said Findings of Fact are also objectionable for the
further reason that said findings are findings of fraud and
misrepresentation, and the provisions of Rule 9 (b),
URCP, pertaining to pleading fraud was not observed by
Respondents, which rule reads in part as follows:
"Rule 9(b) FRAUD, MISTAKE, CONDITION OF
THE MIND. In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity ..." (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of this rule is to require the pleader to
specify the particular acts, representations and conduct
alleged to be fraudulent, and to require the pleader to
show the materiality of the representations with particularity. (Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 U.2d 20, 268 P.2d 988,
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man v. Fabian, 14 U.2d 60,377 P.2d 189.) Respondents not
only failed to aver the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake with particularity, but failed to aver fraud
at all.
The Court erroniously instructed the advisory equity
jury that the burden of proof required was a " ... preponderance of the evidence ... " (R. 74) whereas since its
findings are of fraud, the instructions should have clearly
specified that evidence must be proved by "clear and
convincing'' proof.
Appellants were not advised by the pleadings, evidence
or pre-trial order that fraud and misrepresentation were
issues in the case, and, accordingly, no objection was
made to that instruction. Since the jury was merely
advisory (R. 80) in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 39 (c), URCP, and this action is equitable, the failure
to object to that instruction is immaterial to the right of
the Appellants to raise the question of the propriety of
that instruction on appeal (Rule 72(a), URCP), and the
Court is not bound by the finding of the jury (Smith v.
Richardson, 2 U. 424).
The Findings of Fact concerning alleged false and
fraudulent representations by Appellants and which are
objectionable for the many reasons specified above are as
follows:
(a) That Appellants misrepresented the unpaid balance due on the contract (R. 83, Par. 5).
(b) That Respondents were misled by Appellants' conduct to believe that Appellants would cooperate in arriving at a correct contract balance (R. 83, Par. 5).
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(c) That Appellants intended that Respondents would
rely upon the false representations concerning the contract balance (R. 83, Par. 6).
(d) That the Appellants knew or should have known
that their representations concerning the contract balance were false (R. 83, Par. 7).
(e) That Respondents relied upon Appellants' representations that Appellants would attempt to work out a
correct balance (R. 84, Par. 9).
(f) That the reliance prejudiced Respondents (R. 84,

Par. 11).

(g) That the Respondents failed to make payments
due on the contract pending clarification of the contract
balance and in reliance upon the alleged representations
by Appellants that they would attempt to work out a
correct contract balance (R. 84, Par. 10).
A cursory examination of the foregoing findings shows
clearly that they are founded upon the theory of fraud
and misrepresentation rather than upon the theory of
estoppel allegedly arising from a simple " ... failure to
verify the contract balance ..." which was the only issue
concerning estoppel which was an issue in the case as
shown by the pre-trial order (R. 51, Par. 3). The decision
of the Court is based upon findings of fraud and misrepresentation which were not issues in this case, and
accordingly the decision should be reversed.
The foregoing findings are unsupported by the evidence. Findings (a), (c) and (d) above, to the effect that
Appellants willfully and intentionally misrepresented the
unpaid contract balance are wholly untrue. The Court
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made no finding that the Respondents relied upon these
representations or changed their position in reliance
thereon, and accordingly said findings are irrelevent and
immaterial to the issues in this case.
Appellants had several conversations with Respondents
concerning the unpaid contract balance, various balances
were discussed and some errorts were corrected, however, Respondents were informed at that time that the
balances might be incorrect (R. 149, L. 11-18; R. 155; R.
117) ; that the balances mentioned by Respondents as the
contract balance might be entirely correct (R. 149, L. 1118) and that the balances furnished had been computed
by a third party and had not been examined by Appellants for accuracy (R. 167). Respondents at all times
objected to the contract balances mentioned by Appellants (R. 111; R. 113-118; R. 130-135; R. 155) and claimed
that they were unable to close the Wilcox-Casey sale
because they were never furnished with a contract balance with which they were satisfied (R. 51, Par. 2). Certainly Respondents were not justified in relying upon
said information, and in fact did not rely thereon.
Respondents claimed throughout the case that Appellants were mean, uncooperative, abusive (R. 175, L. 2230; R. 176, L. 176, L. 1-13; R. 140, L. 20-30; R. 141, L. 1-3;
R. 131-132); that Appellants refused to furnish a contract
balance which Respondents could use to close the WilcoxCasey sale (R. 133, L. 5-9) and that 9 days before service
of the notice accelerating the contract balance (R. 9-10)
Appellants warned Respondents that they were going to
foreclose the contract (R. 140, L. 20-30; R. 141, L. 1-3;
R. 132-133).
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The Court observed the inconsistency between the
testimony of Respondents and the claim of estoppel and
the obvious fact that if Appellants' conduct was as
portrayed by Respondents, they could have not been
misled thereby (R. 179), however, the Court apparently
overlooked this obvious fact in reaching its decision.
Findings (b), (e) and (f) above, to the effect that
Respondents were misled and prejudiced by their reliance
upon Appellants' representations that they would attempt
to work out a correct balance and cooperate in arriving
at a correct balance is also untrue. Appellants actually
attempted to compute a contract balance and prepared a
schedule which attempted to allocate the various payments between principal, interest, taxes, etc. and to determine the unpaid balance after each payment (Ex. 5-P),
which schedule and the information thereon was made
available to Respondents R. 114; R. 120;..122; R. 146-151);
however, Respondents failed to take the time to work
out their own schedule of payments and contract balance,
although they could easily have done so since all necessary information was available to them (R. 120-123; R.
137, L. 25-28) , or to compare their figures in detail with
the schedule prepared by Appellants (Ex. 5-P). The
obligation to make payments of $89.00 per month was not
contingent in any manner upon ascertaining the unpaid
balance due on the contract (Ex. 1-P) or upon the completion of the proposed sale between Respondents Casey
and Wilcox, a transaction unrelated to Appellants.
The lack of candor of Respondents' argument is illustrated by the fact that Wilcox was able to ascertain the
balance due on the contract (Ex. 1-P) with sufficient
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
accuracy to permit him to purchase from Schmidts, but
then before even one more payment was made, he argues
that he was unable to ascertain the contract balance with
sufficient accuracy to sell the same property to Caseys,
even though the same information concerning the contract, dates and amounts of payments thereon, taxes and
insurance to be added, etc. was available to him as to
Appellants.
Equitable estoppel requires misleading conduct or language of one person and reliance thereon by another who
is misled thereby to his prejudice (Glendale v. Coquat,
46 Ariz. 478, 52 P.2d 1178, 102 ALR 837; Sovereign Camp
W. W. v. Newsom, 142 Ark. 132, 219 SW 759, 14 ALR 903;
10 Am Jur Estoppel 36, P. 637; 70 ALR 994; 36 Am Jur
Mortgages 387, 398). Respondents' proposed jury instruction No. 11 (R. 70) correctly recites the rule of law that
estoppel requires that the default be caused by the acts
or conduct of the person to be estopped, as where he has
wrongfully prevented payment. (Quoted from 36 Am Jur
Mtgs 398, P. 886-887.) The only thing that prevented the
September, 1962 payment from being made on time and
caused the default is lack of funds in Respondent Wilcox's
bank account, a matter over which Appellants had no
control.
The Court found (R. 83, Par. 4) that the default of
Respondents " ... was the result of unconcionable and
inequitable conduct of the Plaintiffs" (Appellants). The
Court failed to state what conduct of Appellants was
"unconcionable" or "inequitable," and accordingly this
finding, particularly in view of the lack of evidence to
that effect as demonstrated above, and the fact that the
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actual cause of the default was the returned check, is not
sufficient to support the judgment of the Court.
The Court found (R. 83, Par. 8) that the Respondents
did not know the balance owing to Appellants on the
contract (Ex. 1-P) and that without an agreement from
Appellants as to the amount of that balance could not be
required to assume the balance owing to Appellants. This
finding assumes that Appellants had a duty to supply the
contract balance to Wilcox (with whom Appellants had
no contract or agreement) and that the assumption of the
contract balance due to Appellants (Ex. 1-P) was a condition precedent to the obligation of the Respondents to
make further payments to Appellants. The rights of
Appellants and the duties of Schmidt and all of the
Respondents who might undertake to assume and to
perform Schmidts' obligations thereunder, are fully defined in the real estate contract (Ex. 1-P), clearly indicate
that Appellants have a right to collect $89.00 per month
and a duty to convey title when the contract is paid in
full. Until the last payment is due the obligation of
Respondents to pay the monthly installments is unconditional and there is no duty for Appellants to ascertain
the exact unpaid contract balance (55 Am Jur 106, Page
582).

The Court found that Appellants gave Respondents no
notice of default and did not make demand for payment
of delinquencies due on the real estate contract (Ex. 1-P)
before serving notice upon Respondents, declaring the
entire contract balance due and payable (R. 84, Par. 12).
This finding is wholly irrelevent and immaterial to the
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ferred upon them by the contract (Ex. 1-P, Par. 16C) to
accelerate the contract balance without notice, and the
Court should enforce the clear intention of the parties as
expressed by the written contract (Forrester v. Cook,
supra; Burt v. Stringfellow, supra; Udy v. Jensen, supra).
The Legislature has expressly approved acceleration
clauses in notes ( 44-1-2 (3), UCA, 1953), and the holder
of a note is not required to give notice of election to
declare the note due as a condition precedent to bringing
action for its collection (Thomas v. Foulger, 71 U. 274,
282, 264 P. 975). Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the person primarily liable on an
instrument ( 44-1-71, UCA, 1953). Appellants actually
gave notice declaring the balance due (R. 9-10) and
waited 76 days, before commencing this action, to give
the Respondents an opportunity to refinance or to make
other arrangements to pay the contract balance. If action
can be commenced without notice, clearly notice of delinquency and opportunity to reinstate are not conditions
precedent to the rights of Appellants to exercise the
acceleration clause upon default. (36 Am Jur Mtg. 386,
P. 882 and footnote No. 14; Fed. Land Bank v. Wilmarth,
218 Iowa 339, 252 NW 507, 94 ALR 1338.) Even a Court of
Equity cannot enforce generosity. The acceleration clause
in a note is not a penalty (70 ALR 986), the purchasers
being required to pay no more on principal by reason of
exercise of the acceleration clause, and the purchaser
thereby actually saves substantial interest. The Legislature has provided elaborate safeguards and redemption
rights in cases of mortgage foreclosure, which rights will
all be available to Respondents after this foreclosure is
decreed.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants are entitled to a decree of mortgage foreclosure since there is no question about the default of
Respondents in making the contract payments, or the
right or election of Appellants to declare the entire unpaid
contract balance immediately due and payable and to
treat the real estate contract as a note and mortgage. Respondents made no legal tender of the delinquent payment prior to acceleration of the contract balance and
there can be no equitable estoppel since the Respondents
did not change their position to their prejudice in reliance
upon any acts, omissions or conduct of the Appellants,
and Appellants had nothing to do with the cause of the
default. The sole and proximate cause of the default by
Respondents in making the September, 1962 contract
payment was and is the lack of funds in Respondent
Wilcox's bank account which resulted in the check being
returned marked "Insufficient Funds." It appears that all
of the talk about arriving at a contract balance and
suggesting that a tender of delinquent installments would
be made in the future, if Wilcox was able to sell to Caseys,
is nothing more than a diversionary tactic, since those
matters have no relationship to the actual cause of the
default - the insufficient funds check.
The decision of the District Court of, no cause of action,
should be reversed and the case remanded to the District
Court with instructions to enter judgment of foreclosure
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of the mortgage, including a reasonable attorney fee for
services in connection with the foreclosure of the mortgage and this appeal, as provided in paragraph 21 of said
contract (Ex. 1-P).
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER

Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
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